If physical events have sufficient physical causes (closure of the physical), and mental events are not identical to physical events, then mental events are causally redundant. The standard reply is non-reductive physicalism with overdetermination—but genuine overdetermination is rare (two rocks breaking a window). A more promising route is constitution not causation: mental properties are realized by physical properties, and it is the realizer that does the causal work, but we legitimately describe it at the mental level (instrumentalism). This, however, threatens the mental with causal irrelevance.
Even if we fully map neural correlates of consciousness, why should that activity feel like anything? The "easy problems" (discrimination, integration, report) are tractable. The "hard problem" is experience itself. No functional or structural account bridges the gap between third-person data and first-person phenomenology. This suggests either: (a) Consciousness is a fundamental property of reality (panpsychism/dual-aspect theory), or (b) Our current conceptual framework is inadequate (neural correlates of the gap itself may be discovered). remarks on the mind-body question pdf
Consider Frank Jackson’s Mary, who knows all physical facts about color vision but has never seen red. When she first sees red, she learns something new. Therefore, physicalism is false (so the argument goes). Physicalists reply that she gains new abilities (recognition, imagination) not new facts. But this defense concedes that first-person knowledge is irreducible to third-person propositions. A more modest conclusion: science and phenomenology are complementary, not competitive. We need a dual methodology : neurophysiology plus disciplined introspection (as in Husserlian or Buddhist traditions). If physical events have sufficient physical causes (closure